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A Treasure Not Worth Salvaging
Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Idaho, 42 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S.
Ct. 1415 (1994).
Following on the heels of last Term's landmark decision in Seminole Tribe
v. Florida,' the Supreme Court will wade, yet again, into the murky waters
of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence when it hears Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene
Tribe. In Coeur d'Alene, the Supreme Court will reexamine the legal fiction
of Ex parte Young,2 which interprets the Eleventh Amendment to bar suits for
injunctive relief against the state as state, while at the same time permitting
such suits against state officials. Although one decision cannot resolve entirely
the numerous doctrinal inconsistencies within current Eleventh Amendment
law, Coeur d'Alene presents the Court with an ideal opportunity to continue
its efforts to redefine the balance of power in federal-state relations,3 while at
the same time clarifying Ex parte Young's application to suits seeking
adjudication of a state's interest in real property.
Coeur d'Alene arises from a dispute between the Coeur d'Alene Tribe and
the State of Idaho over ownership of the waters, banks, and beds [hereinafter
"submerged lands"] within the 1873 boundaries of the Tribe's reservation.' In
1991, the Tribe filed suit in federal district court5 against the State and
1. 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996). For a discussion among legal scholars of Seminole Tribe's importance to
the ongoing "'federalism wars," see Suing the State Gets Tough. LEGAL TIstEs. Jul) 29. 1996. at S40
2. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
3. The Court has begun to reverse the trend of increasing federal po'er at the expense of state
sovereignty. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1128 (eliminating Congress's abtiit, to abrogate state
sovereign immunity when exercising Commerce Clause powers). United States V. Lopez. 115 S Ct 1624
(1995) (holding that Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause
authority).
4. The Coeur d'Alene Reservation was created by President Ulysses S. Grant's Exccuue Order on
November 8, 1873. See I CHARLES J. KAPPLFR. INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAwS AND TREAnES 837 (1904) As
originally constituted, the reservation included Lake Coeur d'Alene. one of the largest lakes in Idaho The
reservation's size was dramatically reduced by Congress 18 years later. howecr, and most of the
submerged lands in question, including the northem two-thirds of Lake Coeur d'Alene. no longer rest
within the reservation's boundaries. See Act of March 3. 1891. ch. 543. 26 Stat. 989. 1027
5. The Tribe claimed that President Grant's Executive Order. see supra note 4. con.eyed ownership
of the submerged lands to the Tribe. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Idaho. 798 F. Supp. 1443. 1451 (D Idaho
1992). To terminate the State's possession, the Tribe sought four remedies. First. the Tnbe asked the court
241
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 106: 241
numerous state agencies and officials, seeking to gain possession of the
submerged lands. In response, the State contested the merits of the Tribe's
claims and moved to dismiss the complaint on Eleventh Amendment grounds.6
The district court granted the State's motion to dismiss in its entirety.7 On
appeal, however, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's opinion in part
and reversed in part.8 While the panel agreed that the Eleventh Amendment
granted immunity to the State and state agencies, 9 it held the Eleventh
Amendment did not provide similar immunity to state officials."0
Applying the three-prong test endorsed by a plurality of the Supreme Court
in Florida Department of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc.," the court
concluded that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar the Tribe's claims for
declaratory and injunctive relief.'2 The Treasure Salvors test asks:
(a) Is this action asserted against officials of the State or is it an
action brought directly against the State ... itself? (b) Does the
challenged conduct of state officials constitute an ultra vires or
unconstitutional withholding of property or merely a tortious
interference with property rights? (c) Is the relief sought by [plaintiffs]
permissible prospective relief or is it analogous to a retroactive award
that requires "the payment of funds from the state treasury"?1
3
The Tribe passed the first prong of the test because it alleged state officials
were exercising control over the submerged lands in violation of federal law.
According to Ex parte Young, any violation of federal law by state officials
cannot be attributed to the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes.' 4 The
to quiet title to the submerged lands in the Tribe. Second, it asked the court for a declaratory judgment that
the lands are for the exclusive use, occupancy, and enjoyment of the Tribe. Third, it asked for a judgment
declaring all Idaho statutes and ordinances regulating or claiming ownership of the lands invalid. Finally,
it asked for injunctive relief preventing the State and its officials and agencies from "taking any action to
regulate or in any way affect the Tribe's right to these lands and waters." Id. at 1445.
6. See id. The Eleventh Amendment provides, "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States,
by Citizens of another state, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. Xl. The
Amendment has been interpreted to bar suits by Indian tribes against any state that does not consent to such
a suit. See Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
7. See Coeur d'Alene, 798 F. Supp. at 1446. The court found that the Eleventh Amendment barred
all claims against the State and its agencies and prevented the Tribe from "suing the state officials to quiet
title, and for declaratory judgment." Id. at 1448. The court also dismissed the Tribe's bid for injunctive
relief, finding that the State was in rightful possession of the submerged lands. See id. at 1452, In a
discussion which confused the issue of immunity with the merits of the case, the court reasoned that the
Ex parte Young distinction did not apply because the State was not violating federal law. See id. at 1449.
8. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Idaho, 42 F.3d 1244, 1247 (9th Cir.), cert, granted, 116 S. Ct. 1415
(1994).
9. See id. at 1250.
10. See id. at 1254. The Ninth Circuit also found that the Tribe had stated a plausible basis for
ownership of the submerged lands and remanded the case for future proceedings. See id. at 1257.
I1. 458 U.S. 670 (1982).
12. See Coeur d'Alene, 42 F.3d at 1254.
13. 458 U.S. at 690 (quoting Quem v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 346-47 (1979)).
14. See Coeur d'Alene, 42 F.3d at 1251 ("[T]he state's claim of ownership cannot clothe the Officials
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Tribe also clearly passed the second prong: Allegations that state officials were
denying the Tribe rights given to them by the federal government in 1873 were
more than sufficient to constitute an ultra vires or unconstitutional withholding
of property. 5 The court had the greatest difficulty in applying the third prong
of the test. While federal courts are allowed to grant prospective relief
requiring state officials to conform their future conduct to federal law, they
cannot grant relief that is retrospective in nature, such as money damages. 6
The Ninth Circuit avoided the prohibition on retrospective remedies by
characterizing the declarative and injunctive relief sought by the Tribe as
prospective in nature. '7 The court based its ruling on its interpretation of the
Supreme Court's plurality opinion in Treasure Salvors, stating that "federal
courts may not hear actions to quiet title to property, in which the state claims
an interest, without the state's consent,"'' yet "declaratory and injunctive
relief against state officials to foreclose future violations of federal law is
available even if that relief works to put the plaintiff in possession of property
also claimed by the state."' 9 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that Treasure
Salvors allowed the Tribe to seek all "relief [against state officials] other than
relief that would foreclose the State's claim (to ownership] in future judicial
proceedings.20 While the Eleventh Amendment prevented the Tribe from
quieting title against state officials, the Tribe was allowed to proceed with its
action for declaratory and injunctive relief.2' Pursuant to the State's petition,
however, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari to reconsider two issues.'-
The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Justice Stevens's plurality opinion in
Treasure Salvors is more plausible than those of courts that have reached the
opposite conclusion. Stevens's opinion, however, suffers from three fatal
in Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit."). Ironically. "unconstttutional conduct may be 'state action'
for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment yet not attributable to the State for purposes of the Eleventh--
Treasure Salvors, 458 U.S. at 685.
15. See Coeur d'Alene, 42 F.3d at 1251.
16. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651. 663 (1974) (reasoning that if money damages are issued
from state treasury, there is no way to avoid acknowledgtng that state, as opposed to state officials. is real
party in interest) (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury. 323 US. 459. 464 1945))
17. See Coeur d'Alene, 42 F.3d at 1252-55.
18. Id. at 1252 (citations omitted).
19. Id. (citations omitted).
20. Id. at 1254.
21. See id.
22. The first is whether a federal court may, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment. issue
declaratory and injunctive relief"when such relief requires adjudication of [the] state's title and will deprive
[the] state of all practical benefits of ownership of disputed waters and submerged lands " Idaho v Coeur
d'Alene Tribe, 65 U.S.L.W. 3061 (U.S. July 23, 1996) (No. 94-1474). The second concerns the merits of
the Tribe's claim to the submerged lands, and will not be examined in thts Case Note
23. Some courts have reasoned that it is not possible to issue relief against state officials in many
situations without, in effect, quieting title to property. See. e.g.. John G. & Mane Stella Kenedy Memorial
Found. v. Mauro, 21 F.3d 667 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding Eleventh Amendment barred plaintiff from seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief against state official where such relief would place plaintiff in possession
of disputed land); Fitzgerald v. Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel. 866 F2d 16 (1st Cir 1989)
(holding in rem admiralty action seeking injunctive relief preventing Puerto Rican government from
interfering with plaintiffs' title and possession of valuable artifacts barred by Eleventh Amendment)
1996]
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flaws. First, its reasoning is so confused and internally inconsistent that it
provides inadequate guidance to lower courts seeking to resolve property
disputes in which a state is a party. Second, its conclusions are aberrant within
the context of Eleventh Amendment law. 2a And third, it shows insufficient
respect for important principles of federalism. The Supreme Court, therefore,
should use Coeur d'Alene as a vehicle for both overruling Treasure Salvors
and adopting a clear rule preventing federal courts from directly or circuitously
adjudicating a state's interest in real property without a state's consent.
Treasure Salvors arose out of a dispute between a salvage company and
the State of Florida regarding the ownership of artifacts recovered from a
seventeenth-century Spanish galleon discovered off the Florida coast. During
the controversy, the company had asked a federal district court to issue a
warrant of arrest to seize the contested artifacts held by the State of Florida.2
5
In a five-to-four decision, with no majority opinion, the Supreme Court ruled
that officials in possession of the artifacts did not enjoy Eleventh Amendment
immunity from the district court's warrant of arrest. Writing for four Justices,
Justice Stevens found that Florida did not have "a colorable claim"26 to the
artifacts. Because Florida's officials were holding the artifacts without lawful
authority, according to Ex parte Young, their conduct could not be attributed
to the State.27 Thus, while a federal court could not formally adjudicate
Florida's claim to the artifacts, it could issue a warrant of arrest to prevent
state officials from maintaining unlawful possession of the property.28
In Coeur d'Alene, the Ninth Circuit properly interpreted Justice Stevens's
opinion to say that a federal court can issue relief against state officials
affecting a state's possession of real property, so long as it does not formally
adjudicate the state's claim to ownership. 29 Operating within the confines of
Treasure Salvors, the Supreme Court has little choice but to uphold the Ninth
Circuit's ruling on the question of Eleventh Amendment immunity.30
24. See Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 717 (White, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("[Tihe decision has earned a fitting sobriquet: aberration.").
25. See Treasure Salvors, 458 U.S. at 678.
26. Id. at 694.
27. See id. at 696-97.
28. See id. at 699-700. Justice Brennan cast the fifth vote against the State on other grounds. See id.
at 700-01 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
29. While it is possible to view Justice Stevens's opinion as contingent on his judgment that Florida
did not have even a colorable claim to the artifacts in question, see, e.g., John G. & Marie Stella Kenedy
Memorial Found. v. Mauro, 21 F.3d 667, 673 (5th Cir. 1994), such a reading presupposes that Stevens
made the elementary error of confusing the merits of the case with the issue of immunity. A better and
more faithful reading of Stevens's opinion recognizes that the outcome of the Eleventh Amendment issue
would have been the same even if Florida had possessed a colorable claim to the artifacts.
Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit, in Mauro, argued that granting relief that would have the practical
effect of dispossessing the State of real property would be equivalent to recovering damages from the State.
See id. While this position contains great intuitive appeal, it is clearly rejected by Stevens in Treasure
Salvors when he points out that possession of specific property does not involve "attachment of state funds
and would impose no burden on the state treasury." Treasure Salvors, 458 U.S. at 698.
30. As the Ninth Circuit pointed out, neither the declaratory relief nor the injunctive relief sought by
the Tribe would prevent the State from attempting to quiet title in future state court litigation. See Coeur
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Accordingly, Coeur d'Alene presents the Court with an opportunity to correct
a past mistake and overrule Treasure Salvors.
In common parlance, the logic of Treasure Salvors does not pass the -duck
test.' 3' In Coeur d'Alene, if a federal court were to declare that the lands,
formerly managed by the State, were now for the exclusive use, occupancy,
and enjoyment of the Tribe; to hold all Idaho statutes and ordinances
regulating or claiming ownership of the lands invalid; and to prevent state
officials from taking any action to regulate or affect the Tribe's right to the
lands, then that federal court obviously would have adjudicated the State's
claim to the property. The Tribe would obtain possession of the lands in every
meaningful sense. Although the State theoretically could still go to state court
and seek to quiet title, such a ruling would have no practical effect unless the
U.S. Supreme Court were to resolve the inherent tension between the state and
federal court decisions. Therefore, the State, as state, under the Treasure
Salvors fiction, is forced to go, hat in hand, to federal court to vindicate its
title to the lands, a result supposedly forbidden in Justice Stevens's opinion. 12
To replace Treasure Salvors, the Supreme Court should hold that the
Eleventh Amendment denies federal courts the power to issue any relief
against state officials that would have the practical effect of adjudicating a
state's interest in real property. The Court has reasoned that if money damages
are issued from the state treasury, there is no way to avoid acknowledging that
the state, as opposed to state officials, is the real party in interest." It is
similarly absurd to maintain the fiction that the state is not the real party in
interest when a federal court dispossesses the state of real property.
While stare decisis is always a valid concern, the reasons given by the
Court for overruling Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.3 in Seminole Tribe last
Term argue equally well for overruling Treasure Salvors. First, as in Union
Gas, there was no majority reasoning in Treasure Salors." And, second,
Treasure Salvors is a fairly recent opinion on which no substantial body of law
rests. In fact, Treasure Salvors was such a confusing opinion that a substantial
number of courts appear to have misapplied the Court's key holding.6
d'Alene Tribe v. Idaho, 42 F.3d 1244. 1254 (9th Cir.). cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1415 (199 4 )
31. If it walks like a duck, quacks like a duck, and looks like a duck. then it must be a duck
32. Stevens held that a federal court could not adjudicate a state's title in real property sithout the
state's consent. See Treasure Salvors, 458 U.S. at 699-700. Under the Treasure Sahars fiction. hoy ever.
a state can be forced to go to federal court to derive any benefit from holding title to real property While
it could be argued that this is not problematic because a state technically would be giing its consent to
such an action by initiating it, the obvious reality is that a state is being forced into the federal judicial
system against its will by previous federal court action. This is meaningful consent only in an Orclhllan
sense of the word.
33. See supra note 16.
34. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
35. In Treasure Salvors, Justice Brennan never addressed the issue that evenly split the rest of the
Court. In Union Gas, Justice White similarly joined the holding of a four-Justice plurality but disagreed
with the plurality's reasoning. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida. 116 S. Ct. 1114. 1127 (1996)
36. See supra note 23. In Seminole Tribe, the Court similarly noted that Union Gas "ha. created
1996]
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Overruling Treasure Salvors would restore Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence
to its pre-1982 status and affect only a narrow area of law. In those cases that
do not involve the direct transfer of resources from a state to other parties, the
Ex parte Young fiction would continue to apply undisturbed.
The doctrine of state sovereign immunity is crucial to the continued
vitality of federalism. 37 Under our constitutional system, states must have
sufficient freedom to run their own affairs free from federal interference.
Federalism promotes innovative policy experimentation by states, 38
encourages citizen participation in representative government, 39 and, most
importantly, safeguards our liberty as a people.40 These vital functions of
federalism, however, are undermined as it becomes easier for citizens to
subject state governments to the supervision of the federal judicial system.4'
A state's ability to maintain possession of its own property is as
indispensable an element of sovereignty as its ability to control its own
treasury. If a federal court is empowered to reverse over one hundred years of
practice and, in one fell swoop, deprive the State of its ability to preserve Lake
Coeur d'Alene for the benefit of all Idahoans, 42 then what can be said of the
future of Our Federalism?4 3 Will we continue to have a system of dual
sovereignty, or will the fifty sovereign states become little more than servants
of their federal master? While the answers to these weighty questions will not
be discovered in any one case, the Court can take a step in the right direction
by jettisoning Treasure Salvors and finding for the State in Coeur d'Alene.
-Matthew Berry
confusion among the lower courts that have sought to understand and apply the deeply fractured decision."
116 S. Ct. at 1127.
37. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 430 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (describing state
sovereign immunity as "essential component of federalism").
38. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1641 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
39. Noting that "federalism enhances the opportunity of all citizens to participate in representative
government," FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 789 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment in part
and dissenting in part), Justice O'Connor pointed out, "If we want to preserve the ability of citizens to learn
democratic processes through participation in local government, citizens must retain the power to govern,
not merely administer their local problems." Id. at 790.
40. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1638 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[I]t was the insight of the Framers that
freedom was enhanced by the creation of two governments, not one."); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,
458 (199 1) ("Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government
serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power
between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either
front.").
41. The need for federal intervention is particularly questionable in cases such as this where the State
has waived its sovereign immunity in state court. Both state and federal courts "have a constitutional
obligation to safeguard personal liberties and to uphold federal law." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494
n.35 (1976). The Supreme Court has been reluctant to presume that state courts are inadequate fora for
vindicating federal rights. See, e.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 105 (1980) (expressing confidence in
ability of state courts to uphold federal law).
42. See IDAHO CODE § 67-4304 (1989).
43. The phrase "Our Federalism," which was popularized by Justice Hugo Black in Younger v. Harris.
401 U.S. 37 (1971), recognizes that "the National Government will fare best if the States and their
institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways." Id. at 44.
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Principled Silence
Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
For the first time in its history, the Supreme Court has drawn a line that
the state may not cross in its treatment of gay people. In Romer v. Evans,' the
Court was asked to rule on the constitutionality of Amendment 2 to the
Colorado State Constitution, which categorically prohibited gay people from
obtaining legal protection from discrimination based on their sexual
orientation.2 The Colorado Supreme Court had held that the right to
participate in the political process, with which the amendment clearly
interfered, was a fundamental right requiring strict judicial scrutiny, and that
the amendment failed that test.3 The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed on different
grounds. Writing for a six-member majority, and giving short shrift to a
vigorous dissent by Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy held that Amendment 2
was repugnant to the spirit of the Equal Protection Clause. The Court deployed
its most deferential standard and found that "Amendment 2 fails, even defies,
this conventional inquiry ... ; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state
interests."4 The majority thereby answered a question that the Court had left
open in its decision in Bowers v. Hardwick:5 Can the Equal Protection Clause
ever be used to strike down anti-gay legislation? In the ten years between
Bowers and Romer, only one court of appeals had found room for gay people
inside the Equal Protection Clause. Its insistence, now vindicated, that the
1. 116S. Ct. 1620(1996).
2. The parties and the Court adopted the name -Amendment 2'--the title under which the amendment
was submitted to Colorado voters-for ease of reference. See id at 1623. Amendment 2 reads, in full:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation. Neither the State
of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its agencies, political
subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute,
regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct.
practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or
class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status or
claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing.
COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 30b.
3. See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994) (en bane).
4. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
5. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Bowers held that a Georgia statute prohibiting oral or anal sex between
consenting adults did not violate the Due Process Clause when applied to homosexuals. See id at 189 The
Court's previous decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Eisenstadt %: Baud, 405
U.S. 438 (1972), suggested that, if applied to heterosexuals, the statute would not have passed constitutional
muster-a point Georgia conceded. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 218 n. 10 (Stevens, J., dissenting) The Court
did not address that question, see id. at 188 n.2, nor any claim of equal protection. see id at 196 n.8.
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equal protection and due process claims of gay litigants are analytically distinct
remained for years as a lone voice amidst an unsympathetic, hostile throng.6
Romer is the seminal decision in the jurisprudence of equal protection for
gay people. As such, it is the beginning of a story, not the end. This Case Note
argues that Justice Kennedy's carefully crafted opinion foreshadows chapters
in that story that have yet to be written, shedding light on an issue that Romer
ultimately leaves unresolved: Do gay people constitute a suspect class that
merits heightened judicial protection? The Romer Court had two distinct
analytical models upon which to draw, following its two landmark rational
review cases: an open-ended analysis grounded in principle, as exemplified by
Reed v Reed,7 or an exhaustive analysis grounded in fact, as exemplified by
City of Cleburne v Cleburne Living Center, Inc.8 It chose the former,
speaking not at all to the factual record on which the lower court had rested
its decision. That silence carries a message-one that betokens a shift in the
attitude of the Court toward the claims of gay litigants and casts the more
strident portions of Justice Scalia's dissent as a harsh counterpoint to its subtle
theme. To hear this message properly requires attention to context-its absence
in the majority opinion, and its use in the dissent.
The Romer majority introduces its analysis with the proposition that
evaluating the merits of an equal protection claim always depends upon
"knowing the relation between the classification adopted and the object to be
attained."9 Those laws that the Court has upheld against rational basis
challenges, it reminds us, have been "narrow enough in scope and grounded
in a sufficient factual context for [the Court] to ascertain that there existed
some relation between the classification and the purpose it served."'" But the
majority opinion is remarkably devoid of any discussion of the particular traits
that serve to define gay people as a class." Rather, the majority concludes
6. The opinion was written by Judge William A. Norris of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Compae Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1340 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated and aff'd on other
grounds, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) ("[iNothing in Haniwick suggests that the state may
penalizegays for their sexual orientation .... We cannot read Hanwickas standing for the proposition that
government may outlaw sodomy only when committed by a disfavored class of persons."), with Id. at 1355
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting) ("The anti-homosexual thrust of Hardwick, and the Court's willingness to
condone anti-homosexual animus in the actions of the government, are clear."), and, e.g., Ben-Shalom v.
Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464-66 (7th Cir. 1989) (rejecting Judge Norris's analysis).
7. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
8. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
9. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
10. Id.
II. Richard Evans levied a facial challenge against Amendment 2. See id. at 1632 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). A court necessarily conducts its analysis of such a challenge on a more generalized level, as
"the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid."
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). But the difference concerns the type of facts that are
relevant, not the relevance of facts at all. A facial challenge to a restriction requires an inquiry into the
relationship between the restriction and the class rather than the restriction and the individual litigant. See,
e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 64-79 (1972) (striking down portions of Oregon landlord/tenant
statute based on facial challenge and resting decision on characteristics of landlord and tenant classes).
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that no factual context could ever support a classification of such "sheer
breadth" as Amendment 2.12 But this bold statement of principle, when
considered in isolation from the nature of gay people's class status and the
discrimination levied against them, seems discontinuous with the Court's
previous equal protection jurisprudence. Classifications of rights and privileges
based on age, for example, exhibit extraordinary breadth in this country:
Young people are categorically excluded from participating in the political
process, voting, and serving on juries, and older Americans are excluded from
the private and public sectors alike through mandatory retirement ages. Yet the
Supreme Court has upheld such broad classifications on a rational basis
theory 3 by adverting to those "distinguishing characteristics [of different age
groups] relevant to interests the State has the authority to implement,"'" and
to our common interest, as people who age, in protecting both the young and
the old. 5 Similarly, in Roner, it seems to be the combination of the breadth
of Amendment 2, the nature of the classification, and the identity of its target
that so offends the Constitution. On this combination of factors, however; the
majority is silent.
12. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627. The majority offers an alternati e explanation for its result Observing
that Amendment 2 "impos[es] a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named group," it opines
that "[a] law declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others
to seek aid from the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense
Id. at 1627-28. A brief filed by Professors Laurence Tribe. John Hart El). Gerald Gunther. Philip Kurland.
and Kathleen Sullivan, which describes Amendment 2 as a "'per se violation of the Equal Protection
Clause," may have influenced this language. Brief of Laurence H Tribe. cial. as Amici Curae in Support
of Respondentsat 3, Romer v. Evans. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (No 94-1039) Howeverc the Tnbe brief rests
its argument on a reading of Amendment 2 that precludes homosexuality from "being made the basis for
any protection pursuant to the state's laws from an) instance of discnmination. how%,er invidious and
unwarranted," id.-that is, one that exempts gay people even from rational basis revie% The Court
acknowledges that such a reading is possible but finds it unnecessar, to its disposition of the case See
Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1626 ("It is a fair, if not necessary, inference that [the amendmentl depn% cs ga)s
and lesbians even of the protection of general laws and policies that prohibit arbitrar discnmination
The state court did not decide whether the amendment has this effect, howe\ er and neither need vw
Moreover; the majority itself suggests a more appropriate context vwithin which to read its altemnati'.
explanation-the Court's rejection of segregation and second-class citizenship in Bruon V Boand of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The majority's judgment that Amendment 2 is a* "denial of equal
protection.., in the most literal sense," Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628. and hence not amenable to the type
of balancing normally required by the Equal Protection Clause, echoes its holding in Brown that islejparate
educational facilities are inherently unequal." Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. Likewise, the Romer majority's
admonition that "[it is not within our constitutional tradition to enact laws of this sort," Romer, 116 S Ct
at 1628, is powerfully evocative of the Court's judgment in Bolling v Sharpe. 347 U S 497 (1954). the
companion case to Brown, that "[c]lassifications based sole) upon race ... are contrar, to our traditions
and hence constitutionally suspect." ld at 499. The Romer majont) cleary in% itcs the comparison vith
Brown and Boiling: It opens its opinion with Justice Harlan's ringing dissent in Ples.i v Fergu.on. 163
U.S. 537 (1896), the case that Brown rejected, and conspicuoush, cites to Seatt v Painter. 339 U S 629
(1950), one of Brown's progenitors, for a proposition of lav that originated, not in Swvatt, but in Shelley
v Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See Romer, 116 S Ct. at 1623, 1628 ("'Equal protection of the laws is not
achieved through indiscriminate imposition of inequalities."') (quoting Sweatt, 339 U S at 635 (quoting
Shelley, 334 U.S. at 22)).
13. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia. 427 U.S 307 (1976) (appl)ing rational basis
analysis to age discrimination).
14. Cleburne v. Clebume Living Ctr., Inc.. 473 U.S 432. 441 (1985) (discussing .urgia)
15. See Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313-14.
The Yale Law Journal
Such reticence calls to mind the Court's opinion in Reed v Reed.' 6
There, parties to a probate action challenged an Idaho statute giving men an
automatic preference over women for appointment as estate administrators.17
The Court struck down the statute-the first time it had invalidated a law on
the basis of sex discrimination-holding insufficient the State's interests in
administrative efficiency and the reduction of intrafamily controversy"8 As
in Romer, the Court employed a rational basis test; 9 and, as in Romer, the
Court did not engage in a particularized analysis of the classification, despite
a clearly hostile precedent2" and despite the Idaho legislature's finding that
"in general men are better qualified to act as an administrator than are
women."'" Rather, Reed's holding was briefly stated and broadly worded: "To
give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the
other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to
make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal
Protection Clause . . . ."' Thus, the decision in Reed was extremely open-
ended. While the Court took no position on heightened scrutiny for sex
discrimination,' it also provided no fact-based analysis that could have lent
support to a future determination that a gender classification was, in fact,
rationally related to a legitimate end.
Reed is now recognized as the case that ushered in the era of heightened
scrutiny for gender discrimination.24 As Justice Ginsburg wrote in the VMI
case, "[s]ince Reed, the Court has repeatedly recognized that neither federal
nor state government acts compatibly with the equal protection principle when
a law or official policy denies to women, simply because they are women, full
citizenship stature."25 Reed's open-ended, principled structure signaled the
16. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
17. See id. at 71-72.
18. See id. at 76-77.
19. See id. at 76 ("The question presented... is whether a difference in the sex of competing
applicants... bears a rational relationship to a state objective .... ).
20. See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464,465-66(1948) (upholding Michiganb right to draw "a sharp
line between the sexes" and to forbid women to work as bartenders). The Reed Court declined even to cite
Goesaert,just as the Romer majority refused to discuss Bowers. As in Reed, the Romer majority's refusal
to acknowledge hostile precedent may call into question that precedents continuing vitality. Compatm
Nabozny v. Podlesny, No. 95-3634, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 18866, at *33 n.12 (7th Cir. July 31, 1996)
("Of course, Bowers will soon be eclipsed in the area of equal protection by the Supreme Court's holding
in Romer v. Evans.") (citation omitted), with Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989)
("Although the [Bowers] Court analyzed the constitutionality of the statute [before it] on a due process
rather than equal protection basis, Hardwick nevertheless impacts on the scrutiny aspects under an equal
protection analysis."), andRomer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1629, 1631-33 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that Romer holding "contradicts" Bowers holding and that decisions cannot be reconciled).
21. Reed v. Reed, 465 P.2d 635, 638 (Idaho 1970).
22. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971).
23. The Idaho Supreme Court had made no ruling on the issue. See Reed, 465 P.2d at 635. Similarly,
in Romer, the state trial court rejected the claim that gay people constitute a suspect class, and the plaintiffs
elected not to appeal the ruling. See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1341 n.3 (Colo. 1994) (en bane).
24. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976) (identifying Reed as progenitor of cases
applying heightened scrutiny to gender discrimination).
25. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2275 (1996).
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Court's awareness of women's need for constitutional protection and set the
stage for a later, explicit adoption of a heightened standard of review,
The language and analytical structure of Reed and Romer, and the
subsequent history of Reed, stand in sharp contrast to the Court's other
landmark rational basis opinion, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center
Inc.26 In Cleburne, the plaintiffs challenged a zoning ordinance that gave
disfavored treatment to the mentally retarded. On review, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals granted them relief, holding that the mentally retarded
constitute a quasi-suspect class calling for a heightened standard of judicial
review, a standard the ordinance failed to satisf'. 2'7 The Supreme Court, per
Justice White, affirmed the Fifth Circuit's result on different grounds: It
rejected any heightened standard of protection for the mentally retarded but
found that the ordinance could not survive even rational basis scrutiny.' z
The majority grounds each stage of its analysis in Cleburne in a highly
particularized discussion of the class of mentally retarded people and the Texas
ordinance that operated to their detriment. First, in rejecting the application of
heightened scrutiny, the Court investigates the definition of mental retardation
and the problems that attend its treatment, the avenues for legal relief already
available to the mentally retarded, and the sympathetic representation that the
group receives in the political process.- Then, in finding that the zoning
ordinance nonetheless fails rational basis scrutiny, it analyzes with particularity
the stated purposes of the legislature, explaining why they fail to save the
ordinance."0 Unlike its opinions in Reed and Romer, the Cleburne Court's
exhaustive factual analysis leaves no room for subsequent litigants to shift the
analytical paradigm with evidence of their disfavored class status.
Indeed, the Cleburne majority reaches out to foreclose any avenue short
of outright reversal for according heightened scrutiny to the mentally retarded.
As Justice Marshall points out in his dissent, "because the Court invalidates
Cleburne's zoning ordinance on rational basis grounds, the Court's wide-
ranging discussion of heightened scrutiny is wholly superfluous to the decision
of this case."'" Apparently recognizing that future courts might take his
invalidation of the Cleburne ordinance as a step toward heightened scrutiny,
Justice White abandons judicial restraint and engages the issue.
Such restrictive overreaching is entirely absent from both Reed and Romer.
In Reed, the Court declines to address the State's contention that men are more
qualified than women to administer estates.32 In Romer, the Court barely
26. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
27. See Clebume Living Cur., Inc. v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191 (5th Cir 1984).
28. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 435,442, 447-48.
29. See id. at 442-46 & 442 n.9.
30. See id. at 447-50.
31. Id. at 456 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
32. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-77 (1971).
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mentions Colorado's asserted interests in prioritizing discrimination claims,
protecting intimate association, and discouraging political factionalism. 3 The
Romer Court also leaves unexamined the question of whether political
participation constitutes a fundamental right,34 an inquiry that would require
a discussion as to whether the denial of that right only to gay people is, or is
not, constitutional. Romer tracks Reed, rather than Cleburne, employing a
rational basis review that would be entirely consistent with a future
determination that gay people require heightened judicial protection.
Justice Scalia's extraordinary dissent in Romer takes on a more definite
shape in light of the foregoing analysis. The Justice refers to gay litigants' civil
rights struggle as a "Kulturkampf," an assault upon the "traditional sexual
mores" of "tolerant" commonfolk.35  Homosexuals, he writes, are a
"geographically concentrated and politically powerful minority" with "high
disposable income" who have successfully aligned themselves with an elite
"lawyer class," the "knights rather than the villeins," "Templars" who have
betrayed the more "plebeian attitudes" of true citizens.36
When a Supreme Court Justice authors a dissent that uses such language
to describe the parties requesting relief,37 we must strive to understand the
impetus behind his words. In Romer, Justice Scalia's impetus was the need to
respond to the majority's carefully schooled, suggestive silence. The traditional
test for a discrete and insular minority meriting heightened judicial scrutiny
requires, inter alia, a showing that the group is unable to find protection in the
political process.38 There are strong arguments supporting the conclusion that
gay people satisfy this requirement.39 Justice Kennedy does not engage these
arguments at all, howeveI; causing Justice Scalia's diatribe in seeming response
to them to appea; at first blush, like gratuitous shadow-boxing. But it is
Romer's very silence on the question of heightened scrutiny, and on the factual
inquiries that might eventually support its application, that inspires Justice
Scalia to such rhetorical depths. As Reed v. Reed demonstrates, silence, when
properly deployed, can testify to a fundamental shift in the Court's attitude
toward discrimination against a disfavored group. Justice Kennedy's opinion
suggests that another such shift may have occurred.
-Tobias Barrington Wolff
33. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1629 (1996).
34. But see Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628 (opining that "government and each of its parts [should] remain
open on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance.").
35. Id. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 1634-37.
37. Cf Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romerh Rightness, 94 MICH. L. REv.
(forthcoming Oct. 1996) (manuscript at 30 & n.138, on file with the Yale Law Journal) (discussing
overtones of dissent with reference to persecution of gays and Jews during World War 11).
38. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson,411 U.S. 677, 685-86& nn.14 & 17 (1973).
39. See, e.g., Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny for
Gays, 96 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming Nov. 1996) (manuscript at 57-92, on file with the Yale Law
Journal) (discussing disadvantages gays face in finding sympathetic representation in political process).
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